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GIMME THAT OL’ TIME SEPARATION:
A REVIEW ESSAY
Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church
and State
Francis J. Beckwith*
The United States Constitution addresses religion in only
two places. First, Article VI states that “no religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust”1
Second, the First Amendment contains a sequence of words that
many Americans can recite by memory: “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.”2 The phrase “separation of church and
state” has often been employed as a shorthand way to describe
the legal principles that many believe are the basis for the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
However, the
language is notoriously vague, for it gives us no direction as to
the precise meaning of “free exercise,” “establishment,” or even
“religion.”3
It is clear, though, from the text that the First Amendment
was intended solely to limit the law-making power of Congress
and not any other branch of the state or federal governments.
But since the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court, in a
piecemeal fashion, began applying the First Amendment to all
governments in the United States.4 For example, in 1947, in
* Associate Professor of Church-State Studies, and Associate Director of the J. M. Dawson
Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor University.
Ph.D. (philosophy), M.A.
(philosophy), Fordham University; M.J.S. (Master of Juridical Studies), Washington
University School of Law, St. Louis.
1 U.S. CONST. art.VI cl. 3.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3
4

Id.

The Court first incorporated the Freedom of Speech and Press Clauses, eventually
incorporating the entire First Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (stating that freedom of speech and press “are among the fundamental personal
rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (“It is no
longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by
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Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court applied the
Establishment Clause to a non-federal government. 5 The Court’s
justification was a theory of constitutional interpretation known
as the incorporation doctrine.6 The Fourteenth Amendment
states that no citizen may be deprived of “life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”7 Thus, according to the
Supreme Court and many constitutional scholars, many of the
guarantees found in the Bill of Rights, including the religion
clauses found in the First Amendment, apply to the States in
addition to the federal government.8 Whether such a move is
justified is outside the scope of this review.
Regardless,
Americans have grown so accustomed to thinking of their
Federal Constitutional rights as restraints on all governments –
federal, state, and local – that even a logically sound argument
against incorporation is not likely to get very far.9
state action.”); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“The right of peaceable
assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental.”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First Amendment
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”); Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (agreeing 9-0 that the Establishment Clause applies to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment).
5 330 U.S. at 15-18.
6 Id. at 8.
For an explanation of the incorporation doctrine, see Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963):
[T]his Court has looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights
guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment makes them
obligatory on the States. Explictly recognized to be of this “fundamental
nature” and therefore made immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth, or
some part of it, are the First Amendment’s freedoms of speech, press, religion,
assembly, association, and petition for redress of grievances.
Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
7 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
8 There are disagreements among jurists as to what aspects or provisions of the Bill
of Rights should be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Doug Linder,
The Incorporation Debate, at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/
incorp.htm (last visited May 1, 2005).
9 See, e.g., Elk Grove v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2328 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas writes:
Because I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that respondent Newdow has
standing, I would take this opportunity to begin the process of rethinking the
Establishment Clause. I would acknowledge that the Establishment Clause is
a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation. Moreover,
as I will explain, the Pledge policy is not implicated by any sensible
incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which would probably cover little
more than the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. at 2328 (Thomas, J., concurring).
According to Justice Thomas, the Establishment Clause was intended to be a limit
on federal power by forbidding the federal government to establish a national church
while permitting each state to establish a state church if it desired. Id. at 2330. Thus,
because it was not intended to protect any individual liberty relative to the federal
government, it cannot be incorporated through the “liberty” referred to in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 2331. One could add to Justice Thomas’ analysis that, given the
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The notion of “separation of church and state” is a largely
unquestioned dogma in American political and legal discourse
even though the phrase does not appear in the text of the
Constitution. A plain reading of the religion clauses is just as
consistent with some forms of moderate separationism as it is
with strong separationism.10 In his masterful work entitled
Separation of Church and State, Philip Hamburger demonstrates
that separationism has achieved its status in American politics
and jurisprudence largely as a result of an ignoble pedigree,
which harnessed an ambiguously understood slogan – separation
of church and state – to advance a particular view of religion,
state, and liberty, which its proponents consider to be the
“American Way.”11
I.

STORY OF A SLOGAN

Hamburger, who is the John P. Wilson Professor of Law at
the University of Chicago, divides his book into four sections:
Late Eighteenth-Century Religious Liberty; Early NineteenthCentury Republicanism; Mid-Nineteenth-Century Americanism;
and Late Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Constitutional
Law. Hamburger tells the story of a slogan, which was famously
employed by Thomas Jefferson in his Letter to the Danbury
Baptists:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only,
& not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should
Establishment Clause’s original purpose, an incorporation of the Clause through the
Fourteenth Amendment would technically entail that the state, like the federal
government, may not establish a religion. A local government, however, would be able to
establish a religion, just as the states were able to do prior to incorporation.
10 Although it is difficult to precisely define the difference between moderate
separationism and strong separationism, it seems to me that the following is a fair
distinction. First, both affirm that the government should maximize religious liberty
consistent with the public good and prohibit both ecclesiastical control of government
powers and government control of ecclesiastical powers. Second, moderate separationism
does not attempt to marginalize religion in public life, and, for example, would support
public funding programs for similarly-situated religious and secular entities. On the
other hand, strong separationism forbids any direct aid to religion, even when similarly
situated secular entities are given aid. In addition, strong separationists seem willing to
marginalize the political proposals of religious citizens if those proposals are religiously
motivated, though similarly-situated non-religious citizens offering proposals based on
secular grounds are unlikely to suffer the same fate. See Thomas C. Berg, AntiCatholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 122 n.5 (2001);
Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43
(1997); Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and
the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 285 (1999).
11 See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (Paperback
ed. 2004).
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“make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between
Church & State.12

Because Jefferson is one of America’s Founding Fathers, this
letter, which Jefferson wrote while President, has the status of a
sacred text in separationist circles.
In fact, among some
Christian church-state separationists, Jefferson’s Letter to the
Danbury Baptists carries with it an authority not unlike Paul’s
Letter to the Galatians. And yet, Jefferson’s letter is, after all, a
type of communication that presidents produce at least several
times a day to a wide range of constituencies. Given that, it
seems somewhat dubious to base constitutional doctrine on what
amounts to nothing more than a note to political allies seeking
the president’s support for their religious liberty. This note was
not part of an executive order, proposed legislation, or even a
directive offered by the president to the attorney general as a
suggested way to interpret the Establishment Clause. It is not
clear, therefore, why one should take Jefferson’s letter to the
Baptists as any more normative for constitutional interpretation
as, for example, Ronald Reagan’s published book defending the
pro-life position on abortion.13 After all, Reagan, as California’s
governor, signed into law one of the first statutes that
significantly liberalized access to abortion.14 Thus, because the
California law pre-dated Roe v. Wade15 by six years, Governor
Reagan was, in reality, one of legalized abortion’s “founding
fathers,” and thus perhaps possessed a special insight into the
issue’s jurisprudence.
Hamburger points out that Jefferson’s letter embodied a
particular understanding of the relationship between church and
state that was not shared by the Danbury Baptists.16 Rather, the
12 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), 57 THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS INFORMATION BULLETIN 6 (June 1998), available at
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html (last visited May 1, 2005).
13 RONALD W. REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION (1984).
14 See Carole Joffe, 30 Years After Roe v. Wade: Lessons about Abortion from the San
Francisco Nine, at http://www.prochoiceforum.org.uk/ocrabortlaw6.asp (Jan. 2003). She
writes:
The case [of the San Francisco Nine] reverberated in California and across the
nation. In California, it gave new momentum to a bill, previously introduced in
the legislature, that reformers had designed to broaden the grounds on which
abortion would be legally permitted in the state. In 1967 this law passed, and
a reluctant Governor Ronald Reagan signed the California Therapeutic
Abortion Act.
Id.
15 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16 According to Hamburger, “Jefferson’s letter was not entirely a declaration of
liberty. Separation was an idea first introduced into American politics by Jefferson’s
allies, the Republicans, who used it to elicit popular distaste against Federalist clergymen
in their exercise of their religious freedom.” HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 109-10. For
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Danbury Baptists were known as dissenters – those who opposed
religious establishment but did not oppose the influence of
religion on government.17 In fact, because it was assumed that
the moral ecology of a society could not be maintained without
the influence of religion, dissenters had to constantly deal with
the false charge that they were really separationists wanting to
remove any vestiges of religion from the public square. As
Hamburger points out, that was why the “Baptists who sought
the support of the president were . . . silent about his
Jefferson’s letter, in fact, would have been
letter . . . .”18
counterproductive in quelling the fears of those who equated
According to
anti-establishment with separationism.19
Hamburger, “Baptists merely sought disestablishment and did
not challenge the widespread assumption that republican
government depended upon the people’s morals and thus upon
religion.”20
The Danbury Baptists, like most Americans at the time,
maintained that the church and state were two separate spheres.
However, they believed that the church, like other nongovernment institutions, played a vital role in civilizing the
nation’s citizens. In addition, they noted that the church
instilled in citizens the notion that their rights were not derived
from the fiat of governments, but were stamped on them by their
Creator. The Baptists believed that the role of government was
to protect the people’s God-given rights, whereas the role of
religion was to shape the moral understanding of the nation’s
people in order that they might be upstanding citizens.21
According to this view, the United States of America is a
constitutional republic whose institutions presuppose and entail
certain beliefs about the order and nature of things. These
beliefs are nonnegotiable and necessary to maintain the
continuity and purpose of the nation, including the rights of its
people and the powers of its governments (both state and
federal).
The philosophical infrastructure of the American
Republic consists of a cluster of ideals, beliefs, practices, and
the Federalist clergy had “inveighed against Jefferson, often from their pulpits,
excoriating his infidelity and deism.” Id. at 111. Although “[t]he religious dissenters,
including the Baptists, sympathized with the Republicans and distrusted the Federalists,
particularly the Federalist clergy. Yet, when invited by Jefferson to join the Republican
demand for separation, the Baptists quietly declined.” Id. at 110.
17 HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 163-80.
18 Id. at 165.
19 Hamburger notes that: “[I]t may be useful to begin by considering [the Baptists’]
awkward situation. . . . [E]stablishment ministers had long accused dissenters of
advocating separation, whether of church from state or religion from government.” Id.
20 Id.
21 See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 11.
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institutions that are best sustained by a people who see this
cluster as grounded in certain unchanging moral truths that are
religious in nature.
Although the New Testament speaks very little about
government and the Christian’s responsibility as a citizen, there
is one particular passage that may illuminate this Early
American understanding.
Jesus, in a familiar scene, is
confronted by the Pharisees with an apparent dilemma:
“Tell us, then, what is your opinion: Is it lawful to pay the census tax
to Caesar or not?” Knowing their malice, Jesus said, “Why are you
testing me, you hypocrites? Show me the coin that pays the census
tax.” Then they handed him the Roman coin. He said to them,
“Whose image is this and whose inscription?”
They replied,
“Caesar’s.” At that he said to them, “Then repay to Caesar what
belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God.” When they heard
this they were amazed, and leaving him they went away. 22

Generally, “[t]he dominant understanding of this passage is
that Jesus was instructing His audience that the church and
government have jurisdiction over different spheres of
authority.”23 As I have previously expressed:
I believe this understanding is largely correct; however, those who
present it often miss the subtle and political implications of what
Jesus said. He asked whose image was on the coin. The answer was,
of course, Caesar’s. There is, however, an unsaid question that begs to
be answered: What or who has the image of God on it? If the coin
under the authority of Caesar because it bore his image, then we are
under the authority of God because we bear His image. Good
governments, nevertheless, ought to be concerned with the well-being
of their citizens, and these citizens correctly believe that their wellbeing is best sustained by a just government. It follows that both
government and church, though having separate jurisdictions, share a
common obligation to advance the well-being of those who bear God’s
image. 24

Given this understanding, the Danbury Baptists were
troubled that their state, Connecticut, levied a tax to support the
state’s established religion: Congregationalism.
Although
Connecticut did allow Baptists and other citizens to request that
the state redirect their tax money to their own churches, the
process required that “they first. . .obtain, fill out, and properly

Matthew 22:11-13 (New American Bible).
Francis J. Beckwith, Wise as Serpents: Christians, Politics & Strategic Voting, 27
CHRISTIAN
RESEARCH
JOURNAL
3,
52-53
(2004)
at
http://homepage.mac.com/francis.beckwith/WiseAsSerpents.html (original manuscript on
file with author) [hereinafter Beckwith, Wise as Serpents].
24 Id. (citation omitted).
22
23
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file an exemption certificate.”25 And because “Baptists were a
harassed minority, some communities made it difficult for them
to receive these exemptions,”26 which is why they shared their
complaint with President Jefferson.
However, like many
Americans at the time, the Danbury Baptists did not see their
resistance to religious establishment as inconsistent with a
government that accommodates, and even encourages, its people
to embrace an account of rights and human institutions in which
religion, and its moral instruction, is essential.27
II. ANTI-CATHOLIC PREJUDICE AND THE TRIUMPH OF
SEPARATIONISM
In the nineteenth century, separationism surged to
prominence, largely as a Protestant reaction against the influx of
immigrants from predominantly Roman Catholic countries.
Some of these immigrant groups, including Irish and Italians,
had set up their own private religious schools. However, many
non-Catholic Americans believed that Catholic schools
indoctrinated students with superstitions that were inconsistent
with the principles of American democracy.28 Therefore, in order
to make sure that such schools would not receive government
funding of any sort, federal and state legislation was proposed
that forbade the use of public resources for religious, e.g.
25 Derek H. Davis, Thomas Jefferson and the “Wall Of Separation” Metaphor, 45 J.
CHURCH & STATE 5, 10 (2003).
26 Id.
27 Of course, establishment supporters saw anti-establishment dissenters as no
different than separationists. See HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 65-78.
28 Take, for example, these comments by Joseph Martin Dawson:
The Catholics, who [in 1948] are claiming a near majority over all Protestants
in the United States, would abolish our public school system which is our
greatest single factor in national unity and would substitute their old-world,
medieval parochial schools with their alien culture. Or else they make it plain
that they wish to install facilities for teaching their religion in the public
schools.

....
Perhaps the burning issue has arisen soon enough to enable the friends of the
native American culture to arrest the progress of the long-range plan of those
who would supplant it. There can be no doubt about the Catholic plan. Having
lost enormous prestige in Europe, the Church now looks to the United States
as a suitable stage for the recovery of its lost influence. Here it would seek new
ground, consolidate and expand, as compensation for its weakened position in
bankrupt Europe, with the hope of transforming this continent, a Protestant
country, into a Catholic citadel from which to exert a more powerful rule. If
this seems exaggerated and fanciful, the reader has only to open his eyes to
what the Catholics are doing to achieve this end.
JOSEPH MARTIN DAWSON, SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE NOW 98-100 (1948). Special
thanks to the Rev. Dawson’s granddaughter, Alice Baird, for bringing this book to my
attention in her personal correspondence with me. (Personal correspondence on file with
author).
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Catholic, purposes. The most ambitious attempt to put this
sentiment into law was the so-called “Blaine Amendment,”29
which was named after the Congressman who proposed it.30
Although it never became part of the Constitution, some
individual states passed Blaine-type statutes or constitutional
amendments that still remain on the books.31
Hamburger astutely points out that by arguing there was a
need for these amendments, supporters of the Blaine
Amendment and its progeny implicitly conceded that the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, by itself, does not prohibit
the use of public resources for religious purposes.32 Of course,
this would mean that separationist jurisprudence relying on a
Blaine-type understanding of church and state is likely an
improper reading of the First Amendment. This does not mean,
of course, that some modest form of separationism, such as the
traditional anti-establishment position of the Danbury Baptists,
is not correct (as I believe is, in fact, the case). Rather, it means
that a doctrine borne of anti-Catholic animus and a desire to
declare an American Protestant hegemony as the established
understanding of public faith is hardly the “neutral” and
“separationist” creed its proponents have led us to believe.
Ironically, as Hamburger points out, the underlying
principles of separationism were adopted in the twentieth
century by secularists, who were hostile to all religion in public
life.33 They used these principles to eliminate some of the most
cherished practices of many (though not all) nineteenth century
Anti-Catholic Protestant Separationists, including prayer34 and
Bible-reading in public schools.35 These separationist principles
were eventually applied by jurists and scholars to laws reflecting
The proposed amendment text reads:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any
State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund
therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control
of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided between religious sects or denominations.
4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
30 James G. Blaine was a Republican Congressman from Maine.
Biographical
Directory
of
the
United
States
Congress,
1774-Present,
at
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000519 (last visited May 1,
2005).
31 For example, the Constitution of Texas states: “No money shall be appropriated,
or drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any sect, or religious society, theological or
religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the State be appropriated for any such
purposes.” TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
32 HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 296-312.
33 Id. at 478.
34 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 (1985).
35 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).
29
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traditional
moral
understandings
on
abortion36
and
homosexuality,37 as well as to the idea that just government and
constitutional jurisprudence both presuppose that we can know
and apply unchanging moral truths.38
36 Justice John Paul Stevens, for example, offers the following analysis of a Missouri
statute that placed restrictions on abortion and included a preamble that asserted that
human life begins at conception:
Indeed, I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for the
legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that conception
occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
This conclusion does not, and could not, rest on the fact that the statement
happens to coincide with the tenets of certain religions . . . or on the fact that
the legislators who voted to enact it may have been motivated by religious
considerations. . . .Rather, it rests on the fact that the preamble, an
unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no means all
Christian faiths, serves no identifiable secular purpose. That fact alone
compels a conclusion that the statute violates the Establishment Clause.

....
As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state interest in
protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a 9month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth. There can be no
interest in protecting the newly fertilized egg from physical pain or mental
anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does not yet exist; respecting a
developed fetus, however, that interest is valid.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 566-67, 569 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations and footnotes omitted). Justice
Stevens’ judgment that there is no prima facie wrong in killing a pre-sentient human
being because she is not yet sentient is curious. What Justice Stevens should have done
is provide an argument as to why full sentience is the property a human being must
possess in order for the law to be justified in recognizing it as a being worthy of legal
protection. Stipulation just doesn’t cut it.
37 E.g., in his dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Stevens writes:
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by
married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection
extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.
478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court embraced Justice Stevens’ reasoning in a holding
that overturned Bowers and concluded that homosexual sodomy is a protected liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment: “Justice STEVENS’ analysis, in our view, should
have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.” 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
38 For example, separationist law professor Steven G. Gey writes:
The establishment clause should be viewed as a reflection of the secular,
relativist political values of the Enlightenment, which are incompatible with
the fundamental nature of religious faith. As an embodiment of these
Enlightenment values, the establishment clause requires that the political
influence of religion be substantially diminished. . . . Religious belief and
practice should be protected under the first amendment, but only to the same
extent and for the same reason that all other forms of expression and
conscience are protected – because the first amendment prohibits government
from enacting into law any religious, political, or aesthetic orthodoxy.
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As America moved into the twentieth century, separationism
was increasingly perceived as the American understanding of the
Establishment Clause.
Among its most vocal and public
advocates were Baptists, Freemasons, the Ku Klux Klan,
Nativists, and Secularists. One of the most ardent separationists
of the twentieth century, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black,
was a Baptist and Freemason and, up until about ten years prior
to his 1937 nomination to the Court, a member of the Ku Klux
Klan. Although, as Hamburger points out, Black, “[i]n later
years, would discount his association with the Invisible Empire of
the Ku Klux Klan” as an innocent membership in a fraternal

....
[R]eligious principles are not based on logic or reason, and, therefore, may not
be proved or disproved.
....
Whereas religion asserts that its principles are immutable and absolutely
authoritative, democratic theory asserts just the opposite. The sine qua non of
any democratic state is that everything political is open to question; not only
specific policies and programs, but the very structure of the state itself must
always be subject to challenge. Democracies are by nature inhospitable to
political or intellectual stasis or certainty.
Religion is fundamentally
incompatible with this intellectual cornerstone of the modern democratic state.
The irreconcilable distinction between democracy and religion is that, although
there can be no sacrosanct principles or unquestioned truths in a democracy,
no religion can exist without sacrosanct principles and unquestioned truths.
Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 79, 167, 174
(Fall 1990).
Aside from raising the awkward question of whether the claim that “no religion
can exist without sacrosanct principles and unquestioned truths” is an unquestioned
truth about which Professor Gey is certain, one may consult the following responses to the
sort of “reasoning” he is offering his readers. See generally Mark Fisher, The Sacred and
the Secular: An Examination of the “Wall of Separation” and Its Impact on the Religious
World View, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 325 (Fall 1992); HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JUSTICE (1986); HADLEY ARKES,
NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE (2002); FRANCIS J. BECKWITH & GREGORY P.
KOUKL, RELATIVISM: FEET FIRMLY PLANTED IN MID-AIR (1998); C. S. LEWIS, MERE
CHRISTIANITY (1952); Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 106 YALE L.J. 2475, 2486-95 (1997); and Ronald Dworkin, Darwin’s New
Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998).
Because Gey does not interact with any of the relevant literature on religious
belief, morality, and rationality, it is difficult to know how he would reply to the
sophisticated and/or compelling arguments offered by members of the growing intellectual
movement of theistic philosophers in North America and Britain. Among the works that
include these arguments are numerous books that were published before 1990 (the year
Gey’s article appeared in print). They include the following: RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD (1979); RICHARD SWINBURNE, FAITH AND REASON (1981); FAITH &
RATIONALITY: REASON & BELIEF IN GOD (Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff eds.,
1983); WILLIAM LANE CRAIG, THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT (1979); ALVIN
PLANTINGA, GOD AND OTHER MINDS: A STUDY OF THE RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF BELIEF
IN GOD (1967); J. P. MORELAND, SCALING THE SECULAR CITY (1987); JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS
(1983); MORTIMER ADLER, TEN PHILOSOPHICAL MISTAKES (1985); MORTIMER ADLER, HOW
TO THINK ABOUT GOD: A GUIDE FOR THE 20TH CENTURY PAGAN (1980).
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organization, “Black’s account of his participat[ion] in the Klan
was, at best, understated.”39 Hamburger presents a detailed
history of Black’s Klan affiliation which leaves no doubt that
Black was much more than a nominal Klansman who wore his
sheets only on holidays and for weddings.40 According to
Hamburger, “[i]n September 1923, Black joined the powerful
Richard E. Lee Klan No. 1 and promptly became Kladd of his
Klavern [which meant that he was] the officer who initiated new
members by administering the oath about ‘white supremacy’ and
‘separation of church and state.’”41 Apparently, to quote the
comedian Dennis Miller, Black was “burning the cross at both
ends!”42
According to Hamburger, by the time the U. S. Supreme
Court applied the Establishment Clause to the states in Everson,
the separationist understanding was so widely accepted
throughout the country that the Court could make it a fixed point
in constitutional law without the need for any Blaine-type
amendment.43 And the Court did so in Everson, whose majority
opinion was penned by Justice Black.44 The case concerned the
question of whether the Township of Ewing, New Jersey’s
payment to parents for the busing of their children to Catholic
parochial schools, violated the Establishment Clause. Black
concluded that it did not because (1) the payment was not given
directly to a religious organization; (2) the payment was available
to children in all schools, including non-religious private schools;
and (3) it was much like other public services, such as the police
and fire department.45 Although many of Black’s separationist
allies on and off the Court – four of his brethren dissented 46 – did
not like the fact that the Township of Ewing won the lawsuit,
they would in coming years, upon reflection, realize that Black
had delicately and cleverly placed into the arsenal of
constitutional law adjudication, for the first time, the principles
of separationism. Black wrote:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 423-24.
Id. at 422-34.
Id. at 426.
Joe Kovacs, “Dennis Miller jabs Democrat all-stars,” WorldNetDaily, at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=34524 (last visited May 1,
2005) (talking about Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), another former member of the Ku Klux
Klan).
43 HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 455.
44 330 U.S. at 3-18.
45 Id. at 6, 17-18.
46 Id. at 18-63. Justices Jackson, Rutledge, Frankfurter, and Burton dissented from
Justice Black’s majority opinion.
39
40
41
42
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church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever from they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect “a wall of separation between Church and State.”47

Hamburger writes that Black “understood what he was
doing. Only ten years before, when Black was appointed to the
Court, Catholics vociferously condemned him for his Klan
membership.”48 Thus, the facts and circumstances of Everson
afforded Black “an opportunity to make separation the
unanimous standard of the Court while reaching a judgment that
would undercut Catholic criticism.”49 A fellow Baptist and
separationist ally of Black’s, the Reverend Joseph Martin
Dawson, the namesake of the institute in which I hold my
academic appointment, began to understand this as well. In
commenting on the Everson case in his autobiography, he wrote,
“We had lost a battle, but won the war!”50
Despite this victory, and a few subsequent ones for the
separationists,51 the Supreme Court has not fully absorbed the
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 461-62.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 462. See also JOSEPH MARTIN DAWSON, A THOUSAND MONTHS TO
REMEMBER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 194 (1964) (citing the same sentence). It should be noted
that the Rev. Dawson never shared Justice Black’s affection for the Klan. In fact, Dawson
was a courageous opponent of racial prejudice. He writes in graphic detail:
The First Baptist Church upheld a free pulpit. I denounced the Ku Klux Klan
in face of nearly all in the church being members of the Klan. I was most
severe when the Klan’s mob lynched a Negro. My resolutions adopted by the
Waco Pastor’s Association are still being quoted around the country. These
resolutions had been written just after I had seen the mob drag the terrorstricken Negro youth to the city hall square, seen the crazed mobsters toss him
into the flames, in horror beheld them heap the faggots about his tortured
body, gasped as they seized his torso, tied a rope around it to be hitched to the
horn of a saddle for a so-called man to race with it hurtling on the ground to a
creek bed in the country.
DAWSON, supra note 28, at 165. See also, James M. Dunn, The Ethical Thought of Joseph
Martin Dawson 151-186 (1966) (unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary) (on file with the Baylor University Church-State Research Center).
51 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that New York City’s use
of federal funds to help underprivileged children, who attended parochial schools and
were in need of remedial reading and math, violated the Establishment Clause because of
excessive entanglement. The program involved the use of public school teachers,
47
48
49
50
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premises of its jurisprudence. In fact, the contemporary Court
seems to be moving in a direction more accommodating of
religion, especially in the areas of religious speech and public
funding of schools when the funds are directed to the schools by
private choice or when there is no evidence that the funds are
being used for indoctrination.52 There are exceptions, however,
in free exercise cases involving states with Blaine-type laws.53
III. TAKING HAMBURGER SERIOUSLY
By making a convincing case that there are good historical
although no religious symbols in the classrooms or religious indoctrination in the
students’ lessons were allowed), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).
See also Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (issued the same day as
Aguilar and involved similar issues that led the Court to strike down two school district
programs on Establishment Clause grounds based on excessive entanglement), overruled
in part by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236 (overruling the aspect of Ball pertaining to the
“Shared Time” program).
52 See Widmer v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (finding that a religious student
group’s free speech and association rights were violated when it was prohibited by a state
university from meeting on campus); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (ruling that it does not violate the Establishment Clause for a
public school district to permit a church to show, after school hours and on school
property, a religiously-oriented film on family life); Zobrest v. Catalina, 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(ruling that a school district may not refuse to supply a sign-language interpreter to a
student at a religious high school when such government benefits are neutrally dispensed
to students without regard to the public-nonpublic or sectarian-nonsectarian nature of the
school); Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (finding that it was
content-based discrimination for the government to prohibit a controversial organization
from sponsoring a religious display in a public park); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S 819
(1995) (ruling that it was a denial of college students’ free speech rights, as well as a risk
of nurturing hostility toward religion, to prohibit the students from using student-funds
for a religiously-oriented publication); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (finding that
direct funding to private schools, including religious schools, does not violate the
Establishment Clause, since the distribution is evenhanded and the use of the money to
indoctrinate students in religious schools cannot reasonably be attributed to government);
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837-40, 867 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that direct funding to
private schools including religious schools does not violate the Establishment Clause,
since the distribution is evenhanded and there is no evidence that funds given to religious
schools were used to indoctrinate students).
53 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004) (refusing to overturn
Washington’s Blaine-type amendment on free exercise grounds) In pertinent part,
Washington’s Blaine-type amendment reads: “No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the
support of any religious establishment.” Id. at 719 n.2 (quoting WASH. CONST., art I, §
11). The case concerned Joshua Davey, a theology student who qualified for a state
scholarship, but was denied it on the grounds that Washington law forbade any funding
for theological education, even though similarly situated students majoring in philosophy,
history, or chemistry could make use of the same financial help. Id. at 717, 721. The
Court held that states have much leeway in the area of funding, and that Washington
could have a Blaine-type law without violating Mr. Davey’s free exercise rights. Id. at
721. However, the flip-side of this “leeway” is that if Washington had funded Davey’s
theology education it would not have violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 719. So,
contrary to conventional wisdom and the beliefs of some separationist groups, Locke was
not a victory for separationism. See also Witters v. Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P. 2d 1119
(Wash. 1989).
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and textual reasons not to equate separationism with antiestablishment, Hamburger has provided a conceptual scheme by
which courts may affirm the constitutionality of laws that are
tied to religious understandings, but, nevertheless, do not
constitute state establishments of religion. In other words, a
government within the United States may pass laws providing
public approval and sustenance to moral understandings that are
consistent with, congenial to, or have their grounding in certain
religious traditions, and which, simultaneously, are thought to
advance the public good without offending the First Amendment
religion clauses. Although not in line with the agenda of many
contemporary separationists, such an approach would have been
well-received by their anti-establishment predecessors, such as
the Danbury Baptists, who believed in the importance of religion
and morality in the preservation of a Constitutional Republic.54
For example, consider the debate over abortion.
Contemporary separationists generally support abortion rights
on anti-establishment and/or free exercise grounds.55 They argue
that the pro-life position on abortion, that the fetus is a fullfledged member of the human community and is entitled to
As Daniel Dreisbach writes:
Although no friend of religious establishments, many evangelical dissenters
resisted efforts to inhibit religion’s ability to influence public life and culture,
to deprive religious leaders of the civil liberty to participate in politics armed
with political opinions informed by religious values, and to restrain the
freedom of churches to define and advance their own mission and ministries,
whether spiritual, social, or civic.
DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE 52 (2002). Concerning the era in which President Jefferson penned
his letter to the Danbury Baptists, Hamburger writes:
In all probability, therefore, only a handful of Baptists, if any, and no Baptist
organizations made separation their demand. Instead, Baptists focused on
other, more traditional, claims of religious liberty.
54

What Baptists sought not only differed from separation of church and state but
also conflicted with it. Tactically, dissenters could not afford to demand
separation, for a potent argument against them had been that they denied the
connection between religion and government – a serious charge in a society in
which religion was widely understood to be the necessary foundation of
morality and government.
HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 177-78.
55 See, e.g., PETER S. WENZ, ABORTION RIGHTS AS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1992); Paul
D. Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy: Casey as “Catch-22”, 42 J. CHURCH &
STATE 69 (2000) [hereinafter Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy]; Paul D.
Simmons, Religious Liberty and the Abortion Debate, 32 J. CHURCH & STATE 567 (1990);
Stuart Rosenbaum, Abortion, the Constitution, and Metaphysics, 43 J. CHURCH & STATE
707 (2001); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Abortion, 20 BOSTON REV. 11 (Summer 1995). But cf.
Francis J. Beckwith, Law, Religion and the Metaphysics of Abortion: A Reply to Simmons,
43 J. CHURCH & STATE 19 (2001); Francis J. Beckwith, When You Come to a Fork in the
Road, Take It?: Abortion, Personhood, and the Jurisprudence of Neutrality, 45 J. CHURCH
& STATE 485 (2003). Francis J. Beckwith, Thomson’s “Equal Reasonableness” Argument
For Abortion Rights: A Critique, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 118 (2004).
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constitutional protection from the moment of conception, depends
on “[a]bstract metaphysical speculation.”56 Therefore, any law
prohibiting abortion on pro-life grounds would either constitute
the establishment of religion, and/or violate the Free Exercise
Clause by impeding the right of a woman who wants to obtain an
abortion because, under her religious convictions, a fetus is not
entitled to any legal rights.
Of course, it is no coincidence that opponents of abortion are
generally more religious than those who support abortionchoice.57 Opponents of abortion usually accept a view of the
nature of the unborn that is consistent with their religion’s
philosophical anthropology.58 However, those who offer this
point of view in the public square do not merely stipulate the
veracity of their position, as one would expect from people whose
purpose is simply to propound dogmas condemning the
“infidels.”59 Rather, they offer arguments consisting of reasoning
that is remarkably public.60 These arguments are not extracted
56 Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy, supra note 55, at 75. Simmons
writes:
The fact that many people believe strongly that a zygote is a person is by now
well established. The First Amendment allows people to believe as they will as
a matter of conscience or religious belief. That is a matter of freedom of
religion. But as a definition of personhood for constitutional protections in a
pluralistic society, the zygote-as-person rationale is untenable in the extreme.

. . . Abstract metaphysical speculation has its rightful place in theology; but it
must finally be rejected as inappropriate to the logic necessary for democratic
rule.
Id.

57 There are, of course, exceptions. For example, Doris Gordon (Founder,
Libertarians for Life) and Nat Hentoff (writer, THE VILLAGE VOICE) are pro-life atheists.
As far as I know, it is Doris Gordon who coined the term “abortion-choice,” which I use in
this essay and elsewhere. See Doris Gordon, How I Became Pro-Life: Remarks on
Abortion, Parental Obligation, and the Draft, 19 INT’L J. SOC.& SOC. POL’Y 14 (1999).
58 See, e.g., PATRICK LEE, ABORTION AND UNBORN HUMAN LIFE (1996); J. P.
MORELAND & SCOTT B. RAE, BODY & SOUL: HUMAN NATURE & THE CRISIS IN ETHICS
(2000); Francis J. Beckwith, The Explanatory Power of the Substance View of Persons,
10.1 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 33 (2004).
59 This is the stereotype advanced by Simmons when he writes that the pro-life view
of the unborn’s intrinsic value is merely a claim of “Catholic dogma” and/or “special
knowledge” that is neither “subject to critical analysis” nor rooted in “reason.” Simmons,
Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy, supra note 55, at 71-5.
60 Sophisticated pro-life advocates typically argue from the nature of the unborn in
order to establish its standing as a rights-bearer who ought to be protected by our laws.
This type of argument is meant to rebut the typical abortion-choice argument that
equates a human being’s intrinsic value with whether it has the present ability to exercise
or exhibit certain functions, e.g., consciousness, self-awareness, ability to communicate, or
having a self-concept. See, e.g., DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION (2002); Dean
Stretton, The Fallacy of Essential Moral Personhood, at http://www.pcug.org.au/~dean/fe
mp.html (last visited May 1, 2003) [hereinafter Stretton, Fallacy]; MICHAEL TOOLEY,
ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1983). In a nutshell, pro-lifers respond to this sort of
argument by arguing that there is a deep connection between our human nature and the
rights that spring from it, which a just government is obligated recognize. The unborn –
from zygote to blastocyst to embryo to fetus – is the same being, the same substance, that
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uncritically from a religious text or from the pronouncements of a
religious authority. On the contrary, they are fully accessible to
a wide range of people, even those who dispute their veracity
and/or the conclusion for which they are conscripted.
It is not surprising, therefore, that supporters of abortionchoice rebut the pro-life case by offering their own philosophical
anthropology. That is, they present arguments to show that the
unborn, though a human being, does not possess the requisite
characteristics that would require the government to protect it as
a subject of rights.61
Both the pro-life proponent and the abortion-choice advocate
offer contrary accounts of the same being – the unborn. The
former offers a view of the human person that is at home in a
religious worldview, though it is certainly not unreasonable to
accept the pro-life position while rejecting the religious tradition
from which it sprang.62 On the other hand, the abortion-choice
advocate offers an explanation of the human person that denies
the soundness of the pro-life position. The abortion-choice
position is widely held by citizens who are secular in their
worldview and harbor an antipathy to the influence of traditional
religion on public life.63
develops into an adult. The actualization of a human being’s potential, e.g. her “human”
appearance and the exercise of her rational and moral powers as an adult (which
abortion-choice advocates argue determine the unborn’s intrinsic value), is merely the
public presentation of functions latent in every human substance from the moment it is
brought into being. A human may lose and regain those functions throughout her life, but
the substance remains the same being. Moreover, if one’s value is conditioned on certain
accidental properties then the human equality presupposed by our legal institutions and
our form of government – the philosophical foundation of our constitutional regime – is a
fiction. In that case, there is no principled basis for rejecting the notion that human
rights ought to be distributed to individuals on the basis of native intellectual abilities or
other value-giving properties, such as rationality or self-awareness. One can only reject
this notion by affirming that human beings are intrinsically valuable because they
possess a particular nature from the moment they come into existence. That is to say,
what a human being is, and not what she does, makes her a subject of rights.
61 See BOONIN, supra note 60; Stretton, Fallacy, supra note 60; TOOLEY, supra note
60.
62 See supra note 57, 60.
63 For example, the number of organizations and individuals that own websites that
advance a secular worldview while supporting church-state separation and the abortionchoice position are nearly limitless. See, e.g., Internet Infidels Discussion Forum, at
http://www.iidb.org/vbb/archive/index.php/t-79887 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (“Delaware
Valley Chapter of Americans United for Separation of Church and State President Janice
Rael has details on carpools and buses to the March for Women’s Lives from
everywhere.”); Debra Arias, A Close Encounter With the Religious Right, Separation of
Church and State Home Page, at http://candst.tripod.com/tnppage/debbie.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2005) (“I did what I could to support pro-choice . . . because this was the only area
of my life that I felt the radical right threatened. I was wrong.”); AU Joins ‘March for
Women’s Lives’ - Sunday, April 25 , The Wall of Separation: Official Weblog of Au.org, at
http://blog.au.org/2004/04/march_for_women.html (Apr. 20, 2004) (“We encourage all AU
activists to join us in marching behind our church-state separation banner. AU Executive
Director Barry Lynn will be one of the featured speakers at the rally.”); The Affirmations
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Thus, both the pro-lifer and the abortion-choice advocate
present divergent answers to the same question: Who and what
are we? Yet, according to the separationist, only the pro-lifer is
forbidden from shaping public policy because her point of view is
“[a]bstract metaphysical speculation [that] has its rightful place
in theology; but it must finally be rejected as inappropriate to the
logic necessary for democratic rule.”64 But the abortion-choice
advocate attempts to justify his position by offering what is
essentially a different metaphysical account, e.g. one that picks
out certain presently exercisable abilities or functions that a
being must have in order to be afforded the protections of our
laws. There seems to be no good reason, except a type of crass
philosophical apartheid, which would justify the latter account
having a rightful place in politics and law, while its pro-life
alternative is relegated to “its rightful place in theology.”65
The interpretation of anti-establishment as the equivalent of
a total separation of religion from our political and legal
institutions
has
resulted
in
this
unjustified
public
marginalization of citizens who have a religious understanding of
certain political and moral issues. As Hamburger and others
point out, traditional dissenters such as the Danbury Baptists,
did not understand anti-establishment in this way, and neither
should we.66 The courts should not be in the business of siding
with a militant secularism that seeks to have its metaphysics
and morals firmly embedded in our laws while suggesting that
the metaphysics and morals of its religious opponents, regardless
of the quality of the arguments offered, should not even be
considered by the citizenry simply because they flow from a
religious worldview. If liberal democracy means anything, it
should at least mean that all citizens – regardless of the religious
or non-religious source of their policy proposals – should be
allowed to offer their best arguments without first being required
by the courts or mischievous secularists to undergo a
metaphysical litmus test.67

of Humanism: A Statement of Principles, Council for Secular Humanism, at
http://www.secularhumanism.org/intro/affirmations.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005)
(“Mature adults should be allowed to fulfill their aspirations, to express their sexual
preferences, to exercise reproductive freedom . . . .”).
64 Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy, supra note 55, at 75.
65 Id.
66 See HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 163-80.
67 For an extended defense of a similar point of view, see Nicholas Wolterstorff’s
contribution to ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1997).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Hamburger’s book is an important work of compelling
scholarship, and its content is much richer than I can possibly
begin to convey in this brief review essay. Although it is difficult
to predict the Court’s future trajectory in religion-clause
jurisprudence, there is little doubt that Hamburger’s book and its
conclusions, will, and ought to, play a major part in directing that
trajectory.
In his conclusion, Hamburger writes that
“Americans . . . gradually forgot the character of their older,
antiestablishment religious liberty and eventually came to
understand their religious freedom as a separation of church and
state.”68 Thus, despite this view’s widespread acceptance, it lacks
constitutional authority. For this reason and because of its roots
in prejudice, “the idea of separation should, at best, be viewed
with suspicion.”69
Separation of Church and State has, of course, ruffled some
feathers, as do all great books that seek to critically assess beliefs
that once seemed like permanent fixtures of the canon of
conventional wisdom.70 Although it is a hard pill for some to
HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 492.
Id. at 483.
See, e.g., J. Brent Walker, Hamburger wrong about founders’ early Baptists’ view
of
separation,
Baptist
Joint
Committee
on
Public
Affairs,
at
http://www.bjcpa.org/Pages/Views/2002/08.07reflections.html (Aug. 7, 2002) [hereinafter
Walker, Hamburger Wrong]. Walker concludes his review by charging Hamburger with
historical revisionism. Id. Yet, in his attempt to rebut Hamburger’s claim that churchstate separation harms religious liberty, Walker offers an argument that is terribly
misleading:
Moreover, the separation of church and state serves both religion clauses in the
First Amendment. It operates not only to insist upon non-establishment, but
also to ensure the free exercise of religion. In fact, the Supreme Court’s first
use of the words “separation of church and state” came in a free exercise case
in 1879.
Id. But what Walker does not tell his readers is that the 1879 case to which he refers,
Reynolds v. United States, involved a federal statute that prohibited Mormon polygamy
and that the Court ruled in favor of the government and rejected the Mormon Free
Exercise claim. 98 U.S. 145, 166-8. The Mormons were free to believe in polygamy, but
they could not exercise it (which, I suspect, is the point of the practice). The Reynolds
Court writes:
In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is within the
legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a
rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which
the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question
which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion
are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do
not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and
punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be
introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that
human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be
seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not
68
69
70
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swallow, especially those who have linked the veracity of their
theological tradition to separationism,71 integrity demands that
those individuals begin to rethink and re-adjust their
understanding of First Amendment jurisprudence to fit the facts.
Perhaps it is time to take the advice of Jefferson’s predecessor,
John Adams: “Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be
our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they
cannot alter the state of facts and evidence[.]”72

interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty
to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond
the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into
practice?
Id. at 166.
The Reynolds opinion, which Walker cites as supporting his position, does not
seem to square well with his embracing of the peculiar Baptist doctrine of “soul freedom.”
Walker, Hamburger Wrong, supra. Elsewhere on the same website where Walker’s
article appears, Walter B. Shurden hashes out a meaning of “soul freedom” that would
seem to require that the Court permit polygamy between three or more consenting “souls.”
Walter B. Shurden, How We Got That Way Baptists on Religious Liberty and the
Separation of Church and State, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, at
http://www.bjcpa.org/Pages/ Resources/Pubs/shurden.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
71 For example, the Baptist scholar James Dunn writes:
I contend that there is a Baptist identity. There are Baptist spots on our herd
and you can tell them from the others. . . So, without those spots you may be a
wonderful person, maybe a devout and dedicated Christian, far closer to the
Jesus model than I may ever be, but frankly, my dear, you are not a Baptist. I
personally and passionately believe that Baptist Christians are an identifiable
breed. One of our marks is separation of church and state. There is no doubt
that there is an unbroken chain in our “baptist bonafides” from soul freedom to
religious liberty to the separation of church and state, all part of the package.
Thank God Texas Baptists are not among those so-called, semi, pseudo antiBaptists who have turned away from our blood-bought heritage.
James Dunn, Religious Liberty as a Baptist Distinctive, 7 JOURNAL OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS
(Apr. 2001), at http://www.christianethicstoday.com/Issue/033/Religious%20Liberty%
20as%20a%20Bapti st%20Distinctive%20By%20James%20Dunn_033_3_.htm. Although
Dunn’s account of Baptist doctrine may sound like the description of an essential belief or
something that one would find in a creed, elsewhere Dunn denies that Baptists embrace
creeds. Ken Woodward quotes Dunn as saying: “The only Baptist creedis ‘Ain’t nobody
but Jesus goin’ to tell me what to believe.’” Ken Woodward, Sex, Sin, and Salvation,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 1998, at 37.
72 John Adams, 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 98, 269 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller
B. Zobel eds., 1965).

